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Models of Messages: Three Prototypes
Abstract
This paper identifies the problem of analyses of message content as one of making specific inferences
from recorded text to characteristics of a source that are not directly observable. The problem is common
to a variety of analytical situations in the humanities and in the social sciences; and the way adequate
solutions are found therefore deserves systematic attention.
Choices among investigative techniques always imply assumptions regarding the structure of a source. In
message analysis, investigative methods crucially affect the conceivable relations between the recorded
text and the content if presumable conveys to the analyst. While there is no appropriate theory of these
(basically semantic) relations to which the notion of "message" refers, it seems that three classes of
analytical constructs of basic models of messages account for much of current investigative efforts. This
paper examines the nature and limitations of these models which are as follows:
Association models of message are identified by their use of statistical correlations as a logical basis for
content inferences from text. Whether correlations are demonstrated or postulated, such models assume
that content indicators permeate throughout a text, that the text is not purposively intended and that
syntactic constructions and their possible referentiality can be ignored. While preferred by many content
analysts, association models provide the weakest basis for content inferences.
Discourse models take linguistic references as the primary basis for inferences from text. Requisite
analytical procedures are not statistical but essentially algebaical and incoporate psychological or social
constructs of the semantic domain of a discourse. Discourse models are incapable of handling
instrumental uses of language.
"Communication models of messages" refers to a class of analytical procedures that go beyond linguistic
references and/or associations by considering the behavioral constraints that the exchange of messages
may impose on a system of interacting communicators. Recorded texts then take the form of
chronologies of exchanges and communication models render such chronologies informative about the
parameters of an interaction system including the relations among the communicators and their mutual
control. While communication models are the most interesting, least is known about them. This paper
therefore elaborates only on some of their formal prerequisites.
Association models empoly familiar behavioral science methods and therefore provide so serious
obstacles for their possible computerization. Algorithms for discourse models presuppose a considerable
thoretical work, particularly in linguistics and semantics, and it is already evident that no "general
discourse analyser" can be constructed. So far attempts to computerize communication models of
messages have been limited to the most reduced situations. Further, although such models are
potentially most powerful very little can be expected from current computational technology.
The paper finally suggests that efforts should be directed toward formalizations of content inference
processes if analytical success is to be improved.
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ABSTRACT

This paper idimtifies the problem of analyses of message content as one of
·.making specific inferen.cces from recorded te>:t: to characteristics of a
''SOUrcii that- a:i·e not directly observable. The problem is common t.o .a.variety
·;of ·cmalytical<•situations in the. humanities and in the social sciences;: an<!
·' · ~h(:,:'w1ly''adet{uate solutions are- found therefore deserves systematic .atterrtion .
. Ghoices' arhong· 'investigative techniques always imply assumptions regarding, the·
"structute·-·of a'som:ce. In message analysl.s, investigative methods crucially
'affect t:hCJ' conceivable relations between the r·ecorded text and the content i t
presumable· conveys to the analyst. vlhi le there is no appropriate theory •of
these·. (basically semantic) relations. to l·ihich- the notion of "message" refers;
it :seems that three classes of analytical constructs or basic models of
.!!~~,'account for muc.h of current investigative efforts, Thi;p~p~~
excHtline:s the na::ure and limitations of these models \·lhfch are as folloHs:
-A§sociatiot\ models of message are identified by their use of stat is tical.ill>J:::xilii.:!.Qi\li:'as a logical basis for content inferences from text. Hhether
corl.'elations are derr,onstrated or postulated, such models assmr.e that content
indicators permeate throughout a text, that the text is not purposively
intended and that syntactic constructi.ons and thei1: possible referentiality
·can 'be lgnoted~. tVhile preferred by many content analysts, association models
provide the Heakest basis for content inferences.
Discourse models take _linguist:i,.<; J,:gferences as the primary basis for infenmces
fi:6m' text,-·· Requisite analytical procedun's are not statistical but essentl.ally
algehraical arid incorporate psychological or soelal constructs of the semantic
domain of· a' discourse. Discourse models arc incapable of -handling instrumental.
uses of language.
·: '!Comrnuilication models of messages" refe.rs to a class of analytical procedur<?.s· ·
that 'go: beyond· linguistic refen•mces and/or associations by considering thebellavim:al ·constraints that the exchange of messages may impose on a system
of· intiiractilig communicator~, ·Recorded texts then take the form-·of chrono·
'~''
logies of exchanges and communication models render such chronologies
·. h'lfc>·cn\atl.ve about the _p_arameters_ of an interaction systen1 including the
relati.otis ·aludng the communicators and their mutual £9lltro_;h. Hhile corrnnunication
models: are· the· most interesting, least is knOI"ll about them. This paper
. c. c therefore elaborates only on some of their formal prerequisites ..
··' Association-tnodcls empoly familiar .behavioral science methods and therefOJ:e .. ,
"ptovid<! sd -~el:ious obstacles for their possible computerhattou. Algor:i,thms
·for disco<trse models presuppose a considerable theoretical work, particularly
iti 'linguistics and semantics, and H is already evident that .no "general.
discourse ·analyser'' can be constructed. So far attempts .to compl\terize
communi.catl.on models of messages have been limited to the most reduced
situations. Fui'ther, although such models are potcmtially most·pai·Jerfnl·very
little can be expected from current computational technology.
·The paper f:l.mtlly suggests that efforts should be d5.rected toHard fm·maltzations ·-.
of' content inference processes if analytical success is to be improved.
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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I want to suggest three basic models or analytical constructs
that seem to underlie many current investigative efforts regarding the content
of messages.

By distinguishing these models, which are by no means definite

and final, I hope to sharpen a fe'1 critical problems the solution to which
has been avoided by traditional content analysts, mainly because of their
habit of dealing intuitively 1vith the subject.
is not only a matter of intellectual curiosity.
algorithms for automated analysis are sought.

The problem of adequate models
It becomes crucial IVhen

Here I will not presume to give

a detailed formalization of such models, nor can I treat their methodological
and theoretical implications in detail, I rather want to focus on the princ]J:>.les
that go into their construction.

These models thus appear quite general and

can be treated without reference to particular communication situation: as
prototypes,
I admit that much of my interest in inquiries into the content of messages
has been stimulated by the unpardonable misconceptions toward which naive content
analysis research lends itself too easily.
review here; I have dealt

Space does not allow a critical

Hith some of it elsewhere (Krippendorff, 1967).

Because the goals of analytical approaches to the content of messages are so
unclear, I cannot help making explicit the framework to Hhich I want to
confine myself:

The Hessage

Analytic

Situation

For my 01vn Hork I have found it convenient to describe as follows the
situation in which inquiries are made into message content:

(1) In the environment of an analyst there alHays exists .!! real system,
a source 1 , Hhich is singled out for attention.

HoHever the boundaries of

this source are defined, it has typically many interacting components bet1veen
which it{formation may be exchanged.

There is virtually no logical limit to

the kind of source that an analyst may be confronted Hith: international
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systems, political organizations, the mass media, conversational exchanges Hithin
small groups, a system of linguistic references, cognitive interactions, etc.
Such sources may thus be composed of neurons, linguistic items, people and
their objects, social groups or nations.

Source

/

~

Notational System Construct

~-----

.

~,_,~

.

,_{Recorded)____ _
Text J

1 Other /

/
Inaccessible
Components

\

Y

\\
6
''\

\
/

"'--

\

---

:nacces~ible ,~1
I

Components \
of Interest 1

~~-A~~;//

--

Informatlon
-

'
I

(Notations j
J
_ ) Referring to~---,, ______ /
)Inaccessible(
l States _.1

.Diagram of the Message Analytic Situation
Figure

1

(2) The source is only partly observable to the analyst.

Large segments

of it remain in some measure inaccessible to his direct observation: Diplomatic
documents represent onlyasmall aspect of international behavior; the mass
media make available only the "front" of a vast entertainment industry;
psychotherapeutic

intervie~o~s

tap only a small fraction of a patient's personal

history, and markings on stone often are the only remains of an extinct
but complex civilization.
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(3) Communication to the analyst is one-Hay only, i.e., the analyst cannot
manipulate the source and if sorced to study it unobtrusively.

The 1·1ar-time

propaganda analyst can neither request information from an enemy country nor
is the monitored domestic propaganda directed

to~;ard

him; neither can the

analyst aHare of hoH he is being studies through the medium of his 1·1ritings; and
observations recorded during an experiment subsequently become detached and
independent from the situation Hhich they characterize.
(4) The analyst's problem is circumscribed by his interest in knOI·Jle<!g.so
1;hich is not directly accessible to him: Psychoanalysts may want to identify
the psychopathologies of a patient; political analysts may be. interested in
f:Lnding out

h01·1

the social revolution in China proceeds; students of communication

may wish to quantitatively assess hidden gatekeeping mechanisms and psychologists
may be concerned Hith certain latent attitudes of presidential candidates.
(5) The analyst attempts to regard available obse_rvations, the given rm1
data or text as messages, about _?pecific states events or phenomena of the source
Hhich he cannot observe directly.

Stories obtained during a Thematic Apperception

Test may be utilized to infer a subject's motivation; personnlity and cognitive
structure; domestic propaganda may become the basis for inferring Hhether a
secret Heapon system exists; public speeches honoring a head of state may be
processed to reveal the poHer structure within a governing elite; and research
efforts may be directed tOHard inferring the authorship of an unsigned document
from stylistic features,
(6) Since the intended inferences refer to unobserved states of a source,
a formalized language or some notations must be available to the analyst in
terms of which the source is represented either in whole or as far as is
demanded by the analyst's inferential problem.

Psychodiagnosis presupposes

a technical jargon by which psychopathologies are defined unambiguously;
anthropologists l'lhO regard the remains of an ancient culture as messages

-4about its social structure 'need an adequate language in which the content of
these messages may be formulated; political analysts of diplomatic documents
may have to employ elaborate system constructs within which intentions,
consequences, change of poHer structure, etc. find adequate representation.
The analyst's notations may involve nothing more complex than a set of names,
as is the case in problems of authorship identification; or,they may involve
a complex syntax as may be required to describe the possible events Hithin the
type of sources Hhich interest political analysts.
Within this frameHork dogmatic attitudes expressed in such questions as
to

t~hat

the content is become vacant. Hessages do not exist in isolation.

Their

content may be inferred by someone and in reference to some. clearly designated
source about Hhich it becomes informative by virtue of this effort.

Any

observational data can potentially obtain message characteristics for a receiver
to ,.,hom it appears informative.

Similarly, scientific data may become messages

to an analyst if Lhey are tre!'lte.d in such a way that valid information about
unobserved components of a source is gained, regardless of whether data
were generated for this purpose.
as messages about a source is

This ability of an analyst to process data

ofcourse logically prior to the ability .to detect

the message characteristics that a text may have for a particular receiver and,
therefore, deserve special attention.

It should be emphasized that contents,

understood as objects referred to, ideas expressed, events described, or
changes predicted, cannot be analyzed, although it may be possible to consider
data informative about them through

~eec~f_ic ~nference~.

And by the nature

of the message anHlytic situation, the results of such content inferences are
bound to be cast i.n the analyst's formal notations.
The analysis of messages

is then equivalent to an appropriate selection

among the notations of a formalized language referring to possible states of
the inaccessible components of a source (i.e. notations referring to possible
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contents)· as a consequence of data received.

Such a realization of data as

messages about a source always involves content inferences of the type:

IRBI'I )
lData.\-

(Notations )
.......... ····~··· . referring to·>
.
]Inaccessible!
States
J

l.

>~hereby the process2 depicted by the arrow must be adequate J.n reference to a

particular source in terms of ,;hich the appropriateness of the selection or
the validity of the inference

m~y

be assessed.

Hhile I wish to confine myself

to only this frame1·1crk for the analysis of messages; I hope at the same time
to stimulate a discussion about whether this is the sole analytical h·amework
appropriate for the analysis of message content involving data.

Evidently a large number of situations can be described in terms of the
above

frarnc~·70rk.

Insofc.u:: ns this fram?.Hork provides the basis for scientific

investigative techniques it is required that their component procedures and
decisions be amenable to detailed methodological examination independent of
the particular data processed.

It is on this basis that traditional content

analysis must be distinguished from an explicit processing of data

about unobserved

~

messages

phenom:~na.

The analytical process of traditional content analysis is Hell characterized
by Irving Janis, who suggested that it refers
... to any technique a) for the c.lassification of the siw-vehicles
b) Hhich relies solely upon the judgments (which, th~retically, may
range from perceptual discrimi.nation to sheer guesses) of an analyst: or
group of analysts as to Hhich sign .. vehicles fall into which category,
c) on the basis of explicit:IJ: formula!_~! rules_, d) provided that the
analyst 1 s judgments are regarded as the reports of a scientific observer
(Janis, 1965: 55).
It is important to notice that, Hhile the formalized language of traditional

content analysis consists of the explicitly formulated categories of a class-

-6ification scheme, the critical process of inference is never explicated and
relies solely upon the intuitive judgments of an analyst.
To me there can be no doubt that much of our Current concern \vith messages

cannot bypass the judgments of qualified analysts.

Their qualification may

stem from their familiarity Hith the language, their expertise Hith the subject
matter and from the ease with Hhich they gain theoretical insights.

But. to use

~;:,_alysts in the ~;ay traditional content analysis has done is nothing but a ,;ay

of evading the crucial problem of explicating precisely those processes that
account for their ability to regard a text as a message about something.

The term "analytical procedure" can refer to only an explicated process,
one that can be talked about in some detail, one that can be replicated ,;ilh
a minimum of intuitive judgments, or one that has the potential of leading
to a computer program for automatic analysis.

I Hould therefore like to limit

my concern to the making of explicit content inferences.

I

presuppos~

that

data are recor(leo in textual form, and I Hish to consider a text as exhibiting
its structure just on the basis of the distinguishability and identifiability

of its constituent elements.
The term message analysis may therefore be restricted to any scientific
method for making ,'lpecific content inferences from recorded text~
With this definition I

~;ish

to rule out from my concern all traditionr.l

content analysis insofar as the central process of making content inferences
relies on an analyst 1 s intuition and explicit techniques are merely used as
aids to identifying, sorting or courting occurences in a tex/f

The Information Requirements
With this confinement to explicit processes I avoid discussing tHO out
of three sources of inadequacy ,;hich affect the success of an analysis negatively.
Let me mention them briefly.
The most obvious prerequisite for analytical success is that the recorded text

-7accurately represent 1·elevant observations.

To achieve what I 1vi 11 call

"obBervational adequacy" is not at all an easy matter.

Hhat is relevant for a

particular analysis depends not only on the problem chosen by the analyst but
also by and large on his kn01·1ledge about the structure of the source under
consideration.

\vhat is recorded is often neither relevant nor significant, and

what is relevant and significant in the light of systematic theory is often
difficult to transcribe?

Since the level of knowledge about the source may change

during the course of an analysis, the. relevance is not always determinable a priori.
Another prerequisite which is equally important but more difficult to assess

is referential unambiguity of notations chosen to represent content.

I like to

refer to this aspect of analytical success by the term "representational adequacy."
Not only i.s the relevance of such notations dependent on the changing level of
kno<·7ledge about the source, but since content is not directly observable, the
notations refer quite of:ten to hypothetical constrncts or conceptual variables
the representational ambiguity of 1·1hich can be assessed only indirectly (construct
validity).

It is possible to satisfy the requirements of observational and representational
adequacy 1vithout making correct content inferences.
third prerequisite for analytical success.

There remains therefore a

This wi.ll be called "procedural

adequacy," and refers to the appropriateness of the inferential process in
reference to the source under consideration.
\vithout intending to go too deeply into the m:gument, I think traditional
content analysis has been too much concerned with observational adequacy to the
exclusion of the others.

The emphasis on category schemes in 1vhich verbal data

can be recorded easily, the quest for reliability Hithout cot\trol for validity as
Hell, the voluminous and aimless counting exercises all point to negligance
concernlng problems of repn,set~tational, and particularly procedural, adequacy.
In 1952, Harold LassHell observed that:
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... there is as yet no good theory of symbolic communication by Hhich
to predict how given values, attitudes, or ideologies Hill be expressed
in manifest symbols. The extant theories tend to deal Hith values,
attitudes, and ideologies as the ultimate units, not Hith the symbolic
atoms of Hhich they are composed. There is almost no theory of language
1-1hich predicts the specific HOrds one Hill emit in the course of expressing
the content of this thought. Theories in philosophy or in the sociology
of knm·1ledge sometimes enable us to predict ideas that Hill be expressed
by persons l·lith certain other ideas or soci.al characteristics. But little
thought has been given to predicting the specific \•lOrds in Hhich these
·.··ideas Hill be cloaked. The content analyst, therefore, does not kno1·1
Hhat to expect (15:49).

Procedural adequacy of a message analytic process can be assessed in terms of
the appropriateness of the selection among available content representations in
the light of evidence about the inaccessable states to Hhich the notations refer.
Ross Ashby has shO\•lll that the making of appropriate selections is intrinsically
related to the

qu~ntity

of information available to the analyst (Ashby, 1960).

Indeed, many of the analytical problems with Hhich the analyst is faced can be
regarded as problems of making effective use of sparse infOl"'!lation about the source
he is dealing \•lith.

The analyst requires a certain amount of structural information

in order to make procedurally adequate content inferenc.es about a source.

Given that the distinctive characteristic of messages is their informativeness
about unobserved components of a source, and given that the treatment ofa text as
message presupposes that the analyst has available informatl.on about the structure
of that source,
(1)

~<e

can ask four important questions:

Hhat is the ~..tft!Ctur_!' of the information that enables an analyst to make

content inferences about a source?
(2)

1!01·7

can the needed information be !'f.<Jl!i.red, and

~1hat

are the criteria for

assessing the validity of this information?
(3)

How can given information be 2P."'.':..atiQnJ11i>:<=.1, e. g. how can structural
information be

(4)

represe1~ted

in algo1·ithmic form?

Hbat evidence establishes the validity or the
process as a

~·lhole?

sue~~".

of the message analytical
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Clearly, the answer to (1) is required prior to serious considerations of
all other questions.

I therefore limit mysel:tC: to a discussion of just this

question.
Hode ls of He_:e_sages
Questions regarding the structure of the information that enables an analyst
to prJcess messages are in effect questions of semantics.

Since the term has

acquired so many different shades of meaning, I want to avoid it here.

But

these questions can also be regarded, and perhaps more fruitfully so, as being
answerable in terms of partial theories about the source as a system of interrelated
entities, particularly theories that are predictiv.'! in both the dimensions within
which observations are recorded and the ones within which information is of
interest to the analyst,

Since I am not concerned with particular partial theories

that render contents for given texts, but rather with the basic structure of such
theories, I refer to them by the term "models of message."
i.s meant to

This term then

denotes structures of analytical constructs which the analyst may

employ when regarding a given text as a message about some feature of a source.

In the literature on attempts to treat texts as messages in the above. sense,
essentially three mod.'!ls seem to account for most of the content inferential efforts.
Each regards messages differently,

Each has its own merits and limitations,

I

will call these models:
(1)

Association model§. of messages, Hhich realize contents in statistical
correlations bet1veen observational variables,

(2)

Qiscours<O_ models of messages, IVhich consider contents as linguistic referents
and realize it in denotations and connotations.

(3)

Corrununication models of messages, according to IVhich contents become manifest
in processes of control wi.thin dynamic systems of interaction.

-10ASSOCIATION NODELS
The General _t:!atm·e
The

.9.£.

concept~wlly

such Nodels
simplest model for charactel·izing the message characteristics

of a text is based on the idea of statistical association.

21

source can be depicted adequately within a finite number

It assumes that a
dimensions that are

logically or observationally distinct for the analyst, but statistically related
as far as the source's manifest properties are concerned.

Just as the members

of a population may be characterized by a particular set of attributes, so are
the possible states of a source depicted as consisting of a finite number of
components.
Informativeness ·within association models of messages is consequently assessed

by statistical measures of correlation.

Hhen the correlation

bet~<een

tHO sets

of dimensions is high then, in general, an observation on one set of dimensions

yields information about the other set and can hence be considered a message
about those other dimensions.

The recognition of the messRge characteristics

of some text presupposes that the analyst has kno1·1ledge about the ]EUlti.-varir,J:.<;_
E£Qbabili.t:_y distribution of possible events which include the text as components.
One extremely simple and by no1·1 classical examFle of the use of association
models for makinr; inferences from text is John Dollard and Hobart Ho1vrer 1 s study
of the Discomfort Relief Quotient (Dollard and

Ho~;rer,

computed from the frequencies with which tHo classes of
recorded

speec~

1947).
~;ords

This quotient is
occur Hithin

and was found to be indicative of a speaker's state of stress on the

ground that the extent of stress as observed and the value of the quotient
correlated significantly.

George Nahl and Gene Schul& (1964)

revi.e~;ed

this

research tradition recently and showed that a host of measures such as speechdisturbance ratios,

verb~adjective

ratios, and speech rates do have some

diagnostic value to psychologists interested in information about a speaker's
concurrent emotional states or his psychopathologies.
Association models of messages are by no means confined to psychological
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endeavours,

The classical problem of identifying ,the author of: unsigned documents

can employ identical conceptions.

Such a problem may be solved Hhen stylistic

indices can be found that vary little Hithin and as much as possible across
the Hot·ks of suspected authors.

Hhether such stylistic indices are computed

on the basis of the authors' voeabulary (Yule, 191;4), on certain function Hords
(Noste.ller and Hallace, 1964), or on other minor encoding habits (Paisley, 1964),
their informativeness is rendered by demonstrating statistical associations.
In _!!lass media research, association models are even more prominent.

example, measures of the _dive'-':_,;_it:_y of J>Olitical
nC\qspapers of a count1:y have

b{~.cn

~!lb.Qls

For

occurring in the major

shmvn to be indieative of

socio~economic

crisE·s

and feelings of uncertainty (Pool, 1962); journalistic assessments of sensationalism
lead to measures that correlate highly Hith intuitive judgments regarding this
concept (Tannenbaum and Lynch, 1960); similarly

have attempts to infer the

£f'adabilit:_y of a text resulted in the proposal of a set of indices (Flesch, 1951)
In most studies,unfortunately, the statistical associations needed are assumed
and rarely tested for their significance.

The basic assumption of much of

traditional content analysis has been that the relative frequency .vi th Hhich a
certain reference is made \·7ithin a text correlates Hith the attention or importance

assigned by a Hriter to the object referred to.
The content inferences that association models of messages can account for
involves:
(a)

A set of elements (recording units) that are regarded as constituents of the
text without consideration of their sequential order within the text.

(b)

one or more measurements, mi(text), that are made on selected elements of
the text.

(c)

The measuring operation is a mapping

A set of operationally defined terms, t(state), or a variable that represents
extratextual (momentarily unobserved) states of the source.
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(d)

rules of content inference that define a probability distribution, Pm, over
the set ft(state) .,
·(.

··"

of terms or of possible content representations l·lhich

is conditional on the set fm (text), m (text), ... ;
1
2
··

fml (text)' m2(text)' ... ] ""

of measurement·s.

P ( t(state) ) .
m

It should be noted that the conditional probability, P , is a f>:.'!qt;e!l<OY. interm

pretation of probability and the rules of content inferences are not mappings.
A text can be said to be informative about unobserved states of a source if the
probability distribution significantly deviates fl'om chance?
Association models of messages thus requir·e two procedural componentS,

<.1.

measm·ement component and 1·1hat I like to call an association logic; th.e latter
accounts for the content inferences.

Text

This may be depicited in Figure 2.

·· .JLHeasurerne~t]
--·.

Association
Logic

· , .... t(state)

Proeedures of Association Nodels
Figure

2

Hore or less hidden, association models appear in a variety of essentially
different

~~esearch

d_esig11_s.

Naturally, conunitments to this prototype are most

explicit in experimental approaches.

For example, attempting to sho11 the

validity of his contingency analysis, Charles Osgood (1959) set up a situation
in

~1hich

1·10rd association structures could be measured by a standard association

test and correlated 1·lith the results of a contingency analysis of the subjects'
verbalizations.
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Trying to find an ol> ject ive procedure fot· distinguishing real from
simulated suicide notes, Philip Stone and associates

Ht!re

aided by a computer

program that enumerated the occurrence of specified classes of words 1·1ithin a
text,

After inspection of the frequency tabulati.ons a decision criterion was

developed.

The above-chance frequency of success subsequently established

its informativeness (Stone and Hunt, 1963).
Earl Hunt's Concept Learner, on the other hand, is a computer program that

discovers inferential information automatically.

Given tHo texts that are

differentiated according to an outside criterion, Cfor example, being for or
agA.inst a legislative proposal\ the Concept Learner develops

.:1

discriminate

function (involving as many measures as necessary) that accounts for this
differentiation.

This discriminate function, \'/hich in fact takes the form of

a decision tree> can subsequently be used to render a third text informative
about the outside criterion, for example, ·Hhether it supports or rejects the

proposal (Hunt, Harin and Stone, 1966: 159).

PO'i•ler_£ and Lirni ta t_i ons

Researchers assum:Lng association models for their inferences are bound to
believe that the informativeness of a text about

c~

sotrrcc' s states increases

with the number of different measurements that are considered·.

This belief is

due to the nature of multivariate techniques which suggest that the predictability
of a phenomenon can only increase with the number of variables observed?
That an increase in the number of measurements does not guarantee an

approximation of adequate inferential procedures '''as the lesson of a gigantic
yet unpublished study designed by the Institute for Communications Research at
the University of Illinois.

The investigators took as many as 70 vnitten

passages of about 300 words each from such varied sources as The Bible, The
Chicago Sun-Times ar,d a manual fo1· operating a Remington type1-1riter,
these passages 1·1as analyzed in 55 different Hays.

Each of

The 55 different analyses

-14had been suggested in the content analysis litcratm·e and claimed to measure
some effects a text may have on its reader, e.g., retention, interest, Hillingness
to read more material of a similar nature.

The analyses involved simple counts

such as ·the number of first, second and third person pronouns, various indices
such as .readability scores; the average number of meanings per HOrd; and scaled
judgments such as interestingness of subject matter, ho<·l Hell Hritten., In
total, the study was a gigantic design, "a content analysis to end all content
analyses. 1-'

·A factor analysis revealed 10 factors accounting for some 62% of the total
variance.

But most of the factors could not be interpreted in a meaningful way.

If valid, it was argued, the factors should at least be able to distinguish
among texts of different sources.

Positive results Here only slight.

Then a set of texts scoring high, medium, and loH on form factors believed
to be· meaningful Here given to readers Hho Here subsequently subjected to a
series of tests kno,;.,n to measure interest, evaluation, comprehension and

retention of content.

Correlation of the test results Hith each of the factors

yielded no satisfactory results, whereupon HOrk on the text variables was suspended
(Suci and Husek, 1957).

It is unfortunate that important studies are rarely

published when results are negative .
. No doubt that the research had been designed and executed with all necessary.
care.

·It .seems hO'l\•lever, that association models are procedurally inadequate for

the kind of system under scrutiny.

A source that embodies processes of under ..

stauding a text 'linguisticall_y and exhibits active interest in novel assertions
may require models of m<essages that are more poHcrful than association models.
Let me·point to four basic limitations of association models that cannot be
overcome by any increase in the number of measurements made over a text.
·First, association models treat the system under consideration as

sources.

~god_t_~

This is due to the aggregate nature of statistical indices which are
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computed over the occurrences of specified units 'l;·lithin a text.

Discontinuities

in the frequencies of word usc, verbal clarification of meanings and their
consequences must escape the analysis

~·!hen

out regard to their position witltin a text.

\vords or phrases are enumerated with-

Unique occurrences, on the other

hand, do not significantly contribute to correlations sought and although they
may be informative according to some other model of messages, they disappear in
this prototype.

The use of the association model presupposes the assumption

that the enumerated charactcerist.ics £."'.£me.".!§: the given text statistically.
Second, association models preclude considerations of

_E_efer.~ ~anil"!_~·

So far, no statistically significsnt correlation hat hee11 sl1own to exist between
the types of objects in a speBke·.c 1 s or \'ll"iter 1 s envjronment and the type of

,.JOrds he chooses to use,

For example, the frequent use of the term "peace" in

a text neither indicates ,.,hether tlw ,.n:iter finds himself in such a state nor
11hether he desires it.

It does not even indicate I·Jhether he hac ever experienced

such a state or whether he knows what it means connotatively or dcnotatively.
Unless experintental situations impose serious constraints on verbal responses,
inferences as to -.;;qhat a text refers to become vacuous on the basis of association

models,

Hhile undoubtedly rendering given data informative in some sense, the

prototype has very liLtle to do Hith denotations and connotations.

This fact

cannot be emphasized strongly enough since much use of language is understood as
being representational.
Third, association models are incapable of making inferences about .!'_yntactic-.
all:~: ~~pre~'!'_<)_

contents.

That is to say, Hhile co-occurrence and transition prob··

abilities can be used t:o construct a kind of primitive grammar, association models
are not powerful enough to consider sentential grammars.

Among the most outstanding

facts of language is that the number of sentences that a given language admits. is
practically unlimited and that each sentence is essentially a novel sentence. 8
A statistical treatment of S(.>.ntences becomes meaningless, hoHever, ·when
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repetitive occurrances are rare.

Attempts to force syntactically complex

linguistic expressions into a finite non-recursive

enumera~ion

scheme - just to

obtain some frequencies above one - discards much of the communicative capability
of verbalizations.
Fourth, association models are inadequate when a source exhibits some
intelligence and exercises some control over its products, i.e., when the text
is generated to satisfy a source's varying objectives,
first realized by George Hahl who

•~as

This inadequacy 11as

puzzled by the difficulty of inferring

the emotional states of a speaker 11hen linguistic assertions are used instrumentally.
He argued,11ith association models in mind, that;
(o)ur culture places a premium on the concealment of many drives and
affects, and at the samP time our language training and communication
habits emphasize the importance of lexical content. Since affects cannot
be abolished by the censorship of their expression, and since the nonlexical attributes are not the central targets of cultural or personal
control, it is to be expected that the nonlexical features are theoretically
potential targets for consistent re1-1ards and punishments (and may thus)
acquire instrumental functions .... To the extent that this is so, the
value of the nonlexical attributes for the content analysis will decrease.
In general, it 1vould seem to be most advantageous for the content analyst
interested in drives, motives, etc., to select those nonlexical attributes
that are not likely to have been influenced consistently by re1-1arcls and
punishments in the past. The nonlexical ettributes meeting this criterion
are those that are most likely to be most remote from m·wreness in both
the speaker and the listerner (Hahl, 1959: 101-103).
Although Hahl's argument refers to contenr inferences of emotional states
only, it focuses on a general inability of association models.
phrase "minor encoding habits" points

in

Bill Paisley'e

the same direction by suggesting that

stylistic indices may reveal the identity of an author only as long as he is
unable to control their variation (Paisely, 1964).

Likewise is the identification

of psychopathologies conditional upon the inability of patients to manipulate
the symptoms to his advantage.
This limitation may be turned into an analytical advantage when correlations
are found of 1-~hich the source is essentially unaware.

But, association. models

have very little to do with ho1·1 language is normally used and what speakers of a
language express in its terms,

-17DISCOURSE NODELS
The Domain of .!!_ueh

Hod~_ls

I argued that associatl.on models of messages are inadequate 1·1hen there is
reason to believe that the message characteristics of a given text are languagelike, Hhen a text can be assumed to refer to, rather than correlate Hith unobserved
states of a soUrce, and Hhen message contents a1·e in some significant sense

novel as is most typically the case in human communication,

Nm< I will argue for

a more poHerful model - one Hhich treats messages as discourse.

First, some

features of disco.nse as I see them:
(1) Typical discourses such as a political speech, a set of private lette,rs,

a monograph, a ne11s report, a fairy tale or a scholarly treatise can essentially
be considered as describing extralinguistic phenomena, as talking about events
or representing ideas that can potentially be found Hithin a source.

I.e., some

JOvoords occurring in the discourse are names and refer tq, denote, or connote nonlinguistic objects or c.oncepts,

Some sentences are statements about observed

or fictional events and descriptions typically require more than one sentence.
(2) Such discourses may be thought of as generating their OHn parameters,
delineating relevomt issues and defining the meenings of terms in Hhich ·unobserved
phenomena are represented.

Insofar as this is the case,sentences of a discourse

may not be taken in isolation.
(3) Such dis<:ourses are either the product of one person o1· c.omposed in
such a Hay that it is essentially free of inconsistencies or contradiction
Hithin that discourse and in reference to the source,

That is not to say that an

analyst may net disc.over logical gaps or fallacies in the arguments but that the
discourse may be said to be consistent Hith the speaker 1 s or 1-n·iter' s point o£
vie~<,

ideological orientation or ideosyncratl.c logic.
The aim of discourse models of messages then is to account for a reader's

ability to understand what:_!! discourse is about, more specifically, his ability

-18to respond to questions about the source that are pertinent to the analyst and
can be ansHered from a linguistic interpretation of the text.

This ability

requires an adequate symbolic manipulation of Hhat a text implicitly or explicitly
describes, and involves both the paraJ>hrasing of such information in the
analyst's unambiguous notations and the J.nferri.n_g from this information whatever
the analyst wants to know about the source.
·.·· Since I n0\·1 consider both the formal terms referring to the possible contents
of interest to the analyst, and the given text, to be representational, in order
to avoJ.d confusion, I should mention two extreme cases of content inferences.

The simplest situation is one in 1·1hich the text i.s already cast in the analyst 1 s

terms, thus making paraphrasing superfluous and reducing inferences to logical"

implications~

lloHever, the most difficult situation arises when the given text

takes the form of a language foreign to the one in terms of 1vhich the analyst
"~;·7ishC's

to represent his results.

Discourse models 'Hill then have to account for

a translation in Hhich the relevant referential content of the discourse remains
invariant and irrelevant representations are suppressed in the course of the process.

Happily, practical

situa~ions

of message analysis are more likely to be

concerned 1-1llhatext that is recorded in a form closely related to the analyst's
output language, <r.nglish for example), and the major task of discourse models
becomes merely one of extracting relevant information from a text and of mald.ng

content inferences from such information.
Unlike association model<J, discourse models involve the consideration of
linguistic meanings.

In this respect the goal of discourse models overlaps

with the aims of linguistic theory but Hill have to go beyond it, as I Hill sho1v.
Discourse models must c.onsist of at least three components
call grammar, kernelization, and

discou~

J.c>gic.

~;hich

I

~;ould

like to

Ho1-1 these components are

procedurally related may be, seen in Figure 3 which includes abbreviations ·that
Hill become clear later.
these c.omponents:

Let me outline some of the respective features of
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Text"" -

sr
Procedures of Discourse Models
Figure

3

According to the transformational school of thought, the aim of a linguistic
theory of languege is to fine! adequate representations for the structural inform"·

tion speakers enrploy in analyzing and generatJng

verbali~ati.ons.

The Confinement

to structural i.DformatAon ahout .!! language is crucial for linguists because
the information that a language may represent knows virtually no limitation.
Jerry

Fodor~

J!l.

conceive of the granunar of a language that represents a

native's linguistic ability as having three part::> ·· a syntax, a ncmantics, and

a phonology (Fodor, Jenkins and Saporta, 1967).
phonological part becomes superfluous.

Hhen text is written the

The syntactic part is thought of as a

device that either generates a set of represeatations of all and only the wellformed sentences of a language or assigns to each sentence proper a set of
de script ions accounting for the possible ways th<e sentence could have been
generated by that device.

Jerold Katz and Jerry Fodor conceptualize the

semantics of a language as consisting of a lexical dictionary and projection
rules,

The lexical dictionary provides an entry for each lexical item in a

sentence and lir.ts its possible meanings or senses, relevant semantic dimensions
and their use.

And the projection rules provide the basis for amalgamating

syntactic descriptions and meanings to obtain the possible semantic descriptions
or readings of a sentence ·(Katz and Fodor, 1964).

Accordingly, the function

of the granm1ar of a language is to determine the number and kind of readings

-20a native speaker 1o1ould give to each sentence.

For example the sentence:

Time flies like an arrow

may be found to be syntactically normal and to have three semantic readings:
(1) there is a species called "time flies" that prefers arro,.,s;

(2) a request

is made to time the flies as quickly as possible; (3) time moves very SHiftly.
(It· should be noted that the paraphrased content Hhich I used to exhibit the
different readings is not a product of a grammar which would indicate only that
"time flies", for example, is a legitimate noun phrase in English).
A grammar is thus considered as accounting for the process that can be
depicted as follows:

where d(s) is a semantic interpretation of the sentence s of a text.

At this

stage of linguistic theo1-y, such gramma1·s are still quite complex and not at
all perfect,

But their function within a discourse model becomes clear if one

keeps in mind (1) that information about the physical or social environment of a
speaker is not incorporated in a granmwr, and (2) that meanings are not considered
above the sentence level.

Consequently, the lexical dictionary characterizes

the use of linguistic items intralinguistically, i.e. i t _lists meanings or
intentional semantic interpretations, and not the possible referents of those items.
ThG projection rules select among those meanings to satisfy the particular
sentential contexts within 1vhich the item occurred.

words that have meaning but no referent, e.g.,

11

Since there are numerous

maybe," "or,"

11

hello,

11

"ether,"

but the conversG does not exist, a consideration of intralinguistic uses of
linguistic items precedes that of their possible references.

Likewise, semantic

-21descriptions of sentences clearly precede characterizations of their contents~ 0
The Discourse _hogic Component:_
Since the aim of message analysis is to obtain information from given text
about some unobserved part of a source of interest to the analyst, grammar alone
will not suffice.

The extensionality of its output is uncertain.

moclels have to account for is a reader's
a discourse referentially.

ability to understand the sentences of

One test of this ability

the objects to which a text may refer.

\olhat discourse

v~uld

involve pointing to

Since this is impossible by virtue of

the message analytic situation, the only other

t~est

is that the reader be abloe

to draw inferences from the text which are both valid in reference to the soctrce
and relevant regarding the analyst's problem.
seems necessary that the speaker have in

To acconq,lish such infen>nces it

additi~on

to ·his familiarity with the

language some basic kno1;ledge about the subject matter of the discourse, i.e.,
he must employ extralinguistic information.
Understanding the referential content of sentences may become manifest
in a speaker 1 s a hili ty to infer, for example, from the two sentences:
Nark Twain is the author of Huckleberry
Samuel Clemens lived in Hannibal

Finn~

that the author of Huckleberry Finn lived in Hannibal, Hhich presupposes information about the identity of references.

The information that justifies the

inference from:
Robert has a driver's license.
that Robert is above 16 years of age (depending on the state), not blind, knows
how to drive a car, can identify traffic signs, etc., represents knowledge about
a set of properties that are antecedent to the one referred to in the sentence,

-22From:

Jim sa1v his son Bill
Nary and Jim are married
Sam's mother Nary smokes

it is not difficult to infer that Bill and Sam a:ce brothers, provided that some
information about kinship relations is available.

Similarly, even the obvious

inference from "A is larger than B, B is larger than C" to "A is larger than C"
presupposes information about the transitivity of the relation "is larger than."
On the other hand, the relation

"is father

of~~.

has quite different properties

"hich must be known in order to make content inferences that are adequate in

reference to the source under consideration.
These examples show that the information that must be supplied by the reader
in order to demonstrate his ability t·o understand the sentences of a discourse
represent structural features_ of the source patterns or functions that may hold
for classes of the source's states.

The component that accounts for a reader's

ability to make adequate inferences from given sentences may be called "slisc:ourse
logic."

It can be considered the most distinctive feature of discourse models

of messages.

The discourse logic component suggests that a distinction be

drmm between tv7o kinds of sentences
(a)

State descriptions, 11 st," or sentences that refer to particular states of
the source and

(b)

Structure descriptions, "sr," or sentences that refer to relations among
states or classes of states of the source.

(c)

The rules of_ content inference that are permissable >•Tithin a discourse logic
are then of the deductive type, e.g.

The discourse logic of such models thus produces new state descriptions that
are logically implied by the text.

Hhether the required structure descriptions
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are exclusively extracted from the text or Hhether they are incorporated into
the mw.lytical process prior to the analysis, t)le adequacy of the inferences
made is uniquely determined by them.

A discourse logic evidently presupposes that

the text is kernelized and of such a canonical form that the collection of
descriptions represents the relevant content of the text as a Hhole.

HoH this

may be accomplished is suggested belol'l.

The· 'Kernelization

Componen~

Discourse logic essentially requires a set of statements in a canonical form,

---

i.e., each state description or structure description must be of such a form
that it can be taken out of eontext and be used as a basis of discourse logical
inferences.

A grammar, on the other hand, provides

semant~~c

characterizations

for each sentence the content: of Hhich is in s0me significant l·my dependent on
context.

The input of the kernel.ization component can therefore be considered fl.

string of concatenated sets of semantic descriptions for each sentence C?Ccurring
in the text.

Its major aim becomes one of breaking a semantically interpreted

text into eontext independent units and of transforming these units into the
canonical form of state or structure descriptions.

Let me be more specific about

this aim.
First, one of the important features of discourses, 11ith implications for
the construction of a granunar, is their ability explicitly to define or
implicitly to modify the meanings of tenns occurring in the very same discourse.
Such definitions or modifications may affect subsequent readings of a sentence
in a Hay not normally considered IVhen interpreted out of context.

I cannot fully

agree l·lith Katz and Fodor 1·1hen they assume that a grammar provides a set of
alternative semantic interpretations of a sentence among 1·1hich a speaker may merely
select on the basis of his knowledge about the ;>hysical setting in which the
sentence was uttered.

At least as far as the expression of referential content is

concerned, language is a very flexible device.

Although it is easy to imagine

a story, let us say, in Hhich the sentence:
Careless little dogs sleep quietly
is informative about some state of affairs, it is not at all impossible to find
or construct a discourse Hithin Hhich the grammatically normal sentence:
Colorless green idea$ sleep furiously
becomes not only meaningfulll but has content as well.

The granunar that Katz

and Fodor suggest 1wuld be insensitive to linguistic environments which may
specify the meanings of such a sentence's components and would not assign any
semantic description to the latter sentence.

It is only

\•1hen

such sentences

are taken Hithout their linguistic:_ environments_ that they appear semantically
odd.

Almost every discourse can contain such sentences as

By "X 11 is meant 11 such and such,"
I Hant "X" to refer to such and such, or
"X" is defined as

11

such and such. 11

Sentences of this sort refer not to extralinguistic events but to the use of
the linguistic item "X" within a discourse and establish a semantic convention.
Let me refer to such sentences as meaning descriptions, "sm."

Neaning descriptions

often do take up large portions of political, private and scholarly

discoursc~s

and effectively override established meanings.
Hhat I am therefore advocating is an adaptive lexical dictionary, in which
meaning.descriptions can be incorporated after proper translation into respective
canonical forms.
Second, much of normal discourse reli.en heavily on implicit rules for the
use of otherwise semantically indefinite linguistic items.

For example,

pronominal forms are almost: always used and perceived as having definite
references that are understood in the context of other sentences.

If statements are
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to be taken as elements in a set without loss of their contents, i.e., if
their semantic interpretations involving pronouns are isolated from their
immediate linguistic environment, then pronouns have to be replaced by the nouns
in the place of which they stand.

Similarly, when a time sequence of events

is implicitly referred to by the sequential order of. their linguistic representations, a kernelization that loses those references may yield unwarranted
inferences.

Thus, although a language surely does not provide grammatical

constructs above the sentence level, as Katz and Fodor correctly recognize,
speakers do tend to use rather efficient referential constructs to disambiguate
granunatically indefinite references.

Rules based on such constructs clearly

involve information outside the boundary of a sentence.

The explication of

such rules may be difficult, b<Jt their effective use is indispensable 1·1hen a
discourse is to be transformed into a set of state and/or structure descriptions
without loss of the relevant content of the discourse as a wl•ole.
Third, the !<erne liza tion component has to account for a speaker 1 s ability
to rephrase sentences or sets of sentences into a standard format.
descriptions of both

thei1~

Semantic

operant and their transform are to remain equivalent

(Chomsky, 1957; Harris, 1964).

Some such transformations refer to kernelizations

of a compound sentence, such as "he read an interesting book"

·-·----·--~-~

"he read a

book and the book lias interesting," others produce information equivalent transforms
of a !<erne 1 sentence, for example, "he drove the car"
driven by him."

-----·)~

"the car 1-1as

But of particular importance are transformations that eliminate

information 1-1hich is not representable in the formalized language of the
analyst, and is thus irrelevant for the intended inferences.

For example, an

analyst 1-1ho is interested only in interrelations among actors referred to in
a text may 1-1ant to reduce the information represented in

t~<o

sentences:

A British diplomat 1-1as forcibly detained by Red guards as
he was getting out of his car. He Has put on trial in the
street and released after one hour of interrogation.

-26to "Red guards detained the British diplomat 1" and "the British diplomat 1
was put on trial by red guards" or even further "(active) Chinese/ vs./
(passive) British."

The adequacy of such paraphrases obviously depends not

on linguistic considerations alone, but to a large extent on information about
the referential nature of the formalized language used by the analyst.
The function of the kernelization component may be shol'ln analogously to
the· ·above by:
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where the left side of the arrow denotes its input l'lhich takes the form of a
concatenation,

11

,·--...','

of the semantic descriptions of the sentences of the text

and the output iR a set of state descriptions, structure descriptions and

meaning descriptions.

Powers an::l Limitations
The granunar that I have been referring to is, to my knowledge, the only form
that has -lead to computable algorithms.

Although its current stage of formali-

zation is still too complex and computationally too expensive to show significant
analytical advantages when compared l'lith the linguistic efficiency of speakers,
the progress so far achieved is remarkable.

But, since I am not primarily

concerned with Hnguistics, let me give illustrations of some of the other
components of discourse models, ho1·1ever primitive their current manifestation
may be.
In the few cases in which the output of

kernelizat~ons

.is actually written

down, the transformation that accounts for it is achieved mostly by knoHledgeahle
analysts and not by explicit processes.

Hhile this step can then not he

-27considered an explicit analysis, it nevertheless exhibits its significance
v1henever text is considered as having representational message characteristics,

For example, Ole Holsti made use of a canonical statement format in which
sentences representing actions and perceptions of actions of agents (within
the international scene) could be recorded,

The seven possible constituents

of such state descriptions are:
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

perceiver
perceiver other than author of the document
perceived
acU on
object acted upon (other than an actor-target)
auxiliary verb ntodifier
target and incorporated modifier (North, et al., 1963: 137)

If the relationE:hips expressed by a sentence coincide "ith those implied in
the definitions of these facets, then the assumed content of the statement can
be paraphrased and represented in such a canonical form,

Thus the terms of the

analyst's formalized language determine the kind of information that can be
utilized for subsequent content inferences,
In an ongoing international study of values in politics at the University
of Pennsylvania, He undertook to rephrase relevant portions of political
speeches to make the structure Hithin ;,hich political values are expressed
available for subsequent inferences,

(Krippendorff, 1966).

Similarly, Collette

Piault used a notational system consisting of sets of attributes, relations,
references and tHo classes of objects in the terms of Hhich interview data
could be represented for further processing.

But the kernelization was in all

cases done cognitively, i.e, by the intuition of an analyst,
Regarding discourse logics, examples are fewer,

Hhen the content of a text

is represented in some canonical form other than simple categories, most content
analysts go immediately into enumerations, and thus approximate the limitations of
association models.

One good example of a discourse logic, primitive but

nevertheless convincing, is incorporated in Charles Osgood

.!'.!. _al.' s Evaluative

-28Assertion Analysis (Osgood, Saporta and Nunnally, 1956).

The canonical form

of its state descriptions consists of two linguistic items referring to different
objects and an expressed relation between them.

The relation is regarded as

associative or dissociative, and, the affective evaluation of one object is
known, ·by attribution or othenlise , while the evaluation of the second must
be inferred.

This inference is accounted for by the congruity principle of

affe·ctive cognition.

The algebraic operations of the discourse logic which this

principle suggests are fairly simple and explicit.

They purport to represent

some structural features of the system under consideration.
\Vhile I regarded discom·ses as representative of states and structures of
a source, they can quite often be considered as argumentative, in the sense that
conclusions are developed and accepted more or less explicitly.

Such discourses

may reveal some aspects of the discourse logic underlying the use of references and
contents,

EdHin Shneidman, who made use of such information, suggested that there

are individual differences in thinking·or cognitive maneuvers which may be
manifested in the idiosyncracies of either deductive or inductive reasoning, in
the form or the content of the (explicit or implied) premises, in logical gaps
or unwarranted conclusions, etc.

Under the assumption that each individual

employs an "idiologic" that is both consistent and acceptable to him, it seems
possible to infer the logical conditions under which idiosyncracies of reasoning
and cognitive maneuvers appear rational.
analyst constructs a discourse logic or

In doing this systematically, the
11

contralogic," as he calls it, which

"would be that theoretical logical system (l,hich might be operating unconsciously
in the mind of the speaker) which Hould serve to undo or rectify or make
reasonable the apparent idiosyncracies of the speaker 1 s logical posit ions.

Its

purpose is to permit (the analyst) to see what is required - what the speaker
must implicitly believe - to logically "explain" the speaker's own special logic
(Shneidman, 1963: 183).

Although Shneidman uses these logical constructs only
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as an intermediate step to infer psychological traits, the work shows the need
for discourse logics when an analyst considers verbal material as having
referential contents.
From the examples that I have been citing it is quite easily imaginable
that a full formalization of discourse models may become too complex to be
practicable.

Even if an analytical procedure is reduced to a specific discourse,

moilels of the ability of a reader to cognitively handle information about the
subject matter of a text require considerable amount of theoretical comprehension
before they can be put into algorithmic terms,

Neve1·theless, I think this

developu1ent of theory is a prerequisite for the design of computer programs
that process the linguistic contents of volumes of verbal data automatically.
I think the best example of a discourse ;,10del of messages Hhich has been
fully computerized is described by Robert Lindsay (1963),

It

is too simple to

be useful for practical analysis, but is excellently suited to demonstrate how
discourse models of messages have to be constructed algorithmically.

Robert

Lindsay's program accepts only sentences in Ogd"Jl'.§. Basic English and is aimed at
representing and making inferences about kinship relations,

Such sentences as:

Joey was playing 1;i.th his brother Bobby in their
Aunt Jane 1 s yard Hhen their mother called them home
are first subjected to syntactic analysis from which syntactic characterizations
of their sentential structure is obtained,

A semantic analysis subsequently

searches for all expressions that connote kinship relations.

Sentences that

are relevant· according to this criterion are then kernelized and paraphrased
to obtain state descriptions in canonical form of the type "Joey is brother of
Bobby."

The originally rich content of the discourse is thus reduced to the

dimensions relevant for the intended inferences.

The main objective of this

work was to find an inferential memory that represented the discourse logic
implicitly.

Structural information about the source, the system of kin relations,

was thereby assumed perfect,

The discourse logic so constructed then accounts

-30-

for such inferences as from the additional sentences:
Bobby's sister Judy married Edward.
that Judy is Joey's sister, that Ed1vard is Joey's brother-in-law, etc.

Thus

giving a clear demonstration of some understanding of ,;hat the discourse is
about.
, .. The program also demonstrates another feature of discourse models that
contrasts Hith association models.

From the above sentences some uncertainty

regarding Jane's exact position Hithin the kinship network still remains.

But

the reader is informed that Jane is either the sister of Joey's mother or sl,-:>
is the sister of Joey's fatb.er, but not both.

As Lindsay points out, it

HOttle! be inappropriate to assume "a connection such that a given stimulus 1vill
sometimes evoke one association, some times another on a probability basis,.,.

(N)o reader Hould conclude half the time that Jane is the sister of Joey's
mother and half the time that she is the sister of Joey's father, altering
his decision from time to time" (Lindsay, 1963: 231).

Hhi.J.e it is not at all

unreasonable to consider logical interpretations of probabilities for discourse
models, a frequency interpretation of probabili__t:y as required in association
models would be entirely inappropriate here.
Discourse models of messages, the structure of Hhich I have just characterized,
are meant to represent a reader's ability to understand what a discourse is
about.

Hhile such models render a text infinitely more informative about a

source than association models can ever accomplish, even if their formalization
were accomplished, they are still limited on several grounds.

Let me mention

only two basic sources of procedural inadequacy.
First, discourse models cannot handle the ki.nd of outside evidence that an
informed reader may utilize in determining
indeterminate.

whi~h

statements are true, invalid or

To argue that a reader would reject a statement that appears

contrary to experience has its analog in contradictions that may appear in the

-31discourse logic component.

But to determine which of the contradictory statements

•

have to be accepted or refuted :requires inform')tion about those statemE)nt"., such
as the credibility of the source, which discourse models cannot handle.
same inability rcfel'S to attitudinal propositions and quotations.

The

The sentence:

Brown said, "Red guards tried a British diplomat"

for. example, is about Brm-m making a certain noise.

That this noise can also

be regarded as having content requires an additional level of discourse.
Second, Hhcn a source aims at certain effects, statements may be primarily
of an instrumental character rather than rept·esentative.

discourse models may yield entirely inadequate results.

In such situations

AL·guing about the

instrurnental usc of language, George Nahl enumerated the situations in which
a child may utter "I am hungcy."

It may be used when it is unwilling to go to

bed, Hhen in need for attention, etc., and perhaps also when hungry.

To consider

the statement as referring to an existing state of hunger whenever it is uttered
may be entirely misleading,

(Nahl, 1959: 9Lf).

The same situation exists for

the analyst of ;wr propaganda Hho Hishes to infer Hhether 1·efcrred to reprisal
weapons in fact exist (George, 1959: 148).
form of instrumental communications.

Lir,s are af 1:er all the most extreme

If they appear in any shade, parti.cularly

when consistent Hith the remaining content, inferences from a discourse model
of messages are bound to be fallacious.

CONHUNICATION NODELS
The Domain of such Hodels
Communications such as exchanged in interpersonal conversations, political
dialogues and bet1·1een social institutions whether they arc regarded as propaganda,
official documents, ultimata, treaties, conunands, expressions of compliance, etc.,

differ from discourses as considered above: in at least three fundamental ways:
(1) Such communications, while undoubtedly employing certain references, are

to a significant degree composed of sentences that do not convey a representational
kind of information about states and the structure of a source.

Questions,

demands, requests, instructions, and greetings cannot be verified in the sm11e
·way in which stnte clescript::..ons or structure descriptions can be verlficcl and

can hardly be said to have content as far as discourse models are concerned.
Yet such linguistic forms a1·e significant for the understanding of interactions
among language users.

Hhile sentences of this type do not primarily r':'prcsent,

their content may become manifest to an analyst in reference to interactions among
conm1unicators,

(2) Even when such conununications have clear representational message
characteristics, they may have to be viewed as instrumental in achieving certain
objectives.

Purpose is basic to all sources that can be attributed with some

intelligence and in the case of human beings, instrumentality may enter all
spheres of their overt behavior.

Neither association models nor discourse models

are po1verful enough to consider purposive verbalizations.

For example, a guest

who may vant to put his host in the position of offering him a drink by saying
"it's really hot today'.' may or may not have made a true statement.

But the

assertion may trigger a behavioral trajectory that terminates at, among other
things, the guest's obtaining a drink.

If these consequences provide to an

intelligent conununicator the criteria for making ehoices among instrumental
verbalizations, then the analyst has to search for the content of messages in
their possible sonseguences.
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(3) Such corrununications can therefore be said to occur in situations comprising
several conmllinicators, each pursuing its OHn objectives.

The recorded text

cannot then be considered a single consistent discourse but as representing a
pattern of linguistic and non··linguistic exchanges between parties, ."! chronolog_y
of interactions aHlong purposive corrununicators.

Each of these exchanges is

generated by one party and directed to other parties.

Being a response to

previous exchanges, each of them is assigned ."! point in tim" relative to each

12

other.

The relevant context of sentences of

~he

text has thus not only a

linguistic dimension but includes the system of interactions and the changes in
the parameter of such a system as well.
Perhaps one can appreci"'1te the complexity of the som·ce with 1vhich
communication models of messages have now to deal when imagining a chess-like
gamel3 in which each player chooses his own objectives and has some advantage
in not revealing it to the other, in Hhich rules are freely negotiable ·during
the play and may indeed be violated, and in 1·1hich each party may Hant to put only
few of its pmms on the board and is free to choose to talk about the position of
the rest.
exchanges.

All that the analyst obtains is the chronology of moves and verbal
Discourse models Hould merely infer Hhat paHns are being talked about.

Association models HOuld be entirely inappropriate since much of Hhat is going
on in the course of a play is not directly observable.

Conununication models of

messages, on the other hand, are expected to render the recorded verbalizations
informative about the implicit and explicit rules that develop in the course of
a play, about the pattern of compliance to these rules, about the objectives on
Hhich each player may settle interdependently, and about the nature of the
cooperative or competitive relation that may emerge between them.

Thus, in his

attempt to understand the system from the recorded exchanges, the analyst who
makes use of communication models of messages may Hish at times to outwit the
players' intentions, predict the consequences of their moves, and describe the
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interlocking properties of the play
linguistic interactions.

~;hich

govern both the linguistic and non-

In other words, the analyst aims at inferring the

structure of a dynamic system, its operating rules and controls

fror~

linguistic exchanges between, and interactions among, potentially

the recorded

purposive

conununicators.

Analytical constRucts of conununicati.on situations that could render such a
chl;·onology of interactions informative about the parameters of a dynamic system
or, more specifically, models of messages that identify the content of linguistic
exchanges wi.th the outcome of controls governing the interactions among purposive
conmmnicators, are extremely complex and difficult to formalize,

I cannot claim

to have solved any of the pro:>lems associated with such models, nor do I believe
that algorithmic solutions can be found within a short period of time except,
perhaps, for the most reduced cases.

Hy confidence in the possibility of

constructing cmnmunication models of messages lies in the fact that intcll:i.gent
conununicators continually usc communication conceptions '!;·Then either generating

messages that have certain intended or unintentional effects or receiving and

analy?.ing them in these terms.

Even when those messages are exchanged between

social groups or nations, analysts have been able to make rather reliable
speculations regarding the patterns about which such messages may be informative.
Systematic attempts to extract military intelligence from domestic war propaganda
(George, 1959), the little published work of numerous foreign specialists who
analyze diplomatic exchanges before adequate responses are formulated, and scholarly
concerns with the possibilities of inferring whether the signatories of a
disarmament agreement still confonn to their comHtments, (Singer, 1963) provide,
if not examples of success, at least of reasonable hopes.

I am therefore

convinced that it may be possible to make progress regarding the understanding of
conununication models of messages if at least some of their formal prerequites are
clarified.

I will start 1·1ith the instrumental frame of reference.
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Requisite Information Hierarchies
The last conference on content analysis, tHelve years ago, introduced the
issue of instrumental comnmn:ications.

Summarizing ho,.·7 far the discussion had

gone, Ithiel de Sola Pool suggested four variables - the content (which 1·1as use.d
almost interchangeably with our 'text~, it's authors internal states, his
manipulative strategies, and the states of the universe.
wa~·

Huch of content analysis

then concerned with making inferences from text to an author's internal

states according to an association model.

"Instrumental" Has attributed by

Pool to "that Hhi.ch is manipulated (and thus varied in i.ts relation to the
thing being inde:.<ed so as to achieve the author's objectives.)"

Relying on t:his

assoeiation model, the assertion of the independence of mai.lipulative str:ategies

and internal states inl'lies the absence· of stable relationships bet1-1een text
and internal states, thus making the task of the content analyst extremely
difficult (Pool, 1959).
Hany every·· day instn.unental acts

refe1~

to the manipulation of r.ausc:l chaj_ns.

Hishing to enter a house, a visitor may have several possible acts at his diposal.
A particular choice among them ah1ays represents the outcome of complex cognitive
processes.

Only the behavior is observed, ho1-1ever - a particular button is

pushed and entry to the house is granted if certain other conditions are
satisfied.

Although correlations bet1·1een objective (entering the house) and the

observed instrumental act may be found, -it makes little sense to explain
instrumental behavior that ,.Jay,
I think the simpliest frame1-1ork capable of considering instrumental acts is
one that regards the action of an agent in reference to his attempt to keep some
essential states (1-1hi.ch may be subject to external disturbances) under control.
At least the follo1-1ing may be distinguished:
(a)

T.he agent's essentia 1 states.

(b)

T.he voluntary strategies available.

-36(c)

The perceivable environmental situations,

(d)

T:he agent's knoHledge about the changes in the essential states as
a consequence of initiating certai11 strate~ies in given situations.

(e)

The agenL 1 s objective, a subset of the essential states.

(f)

A rationale (or principle of evaluation) for choosing among available
strategies on the bases of the current essential state, the objective
and the predicted consequences.

Even if the situation is simple, the alternatives are finite and enumerable,
and the environment of the manipulating agent is a strictly causal one, the
analyst has to find not only a representation of the information the agent uses,
but also a repre.sentat:i.on of the information the agent possesses about the
consequences of his stratE:gi.es.
at once involve a hierarchy g[

Analytical cons true ts of instrumental behavior
~

of information and their effective

operationalizatiott.

l-n1en the situation is such that the manipulating agent communicates verbally

Hith other intelligent beings, his requisite knowledge increases tremendously in
complexity.

Even a rational child, for example, which considers lying to its

parent will have to possess at least something equivalent to a discourse model
that represents the parent's ability to understand its assertions.

It will also

have to have kno,.ledge about the parent's access to factual information about
the subject matter plus kno1·1ledge about the behavioral consequences conditional
on their possessing the kind of information the child is considering to produce,
Hore involved is the situation of a congressman who Hishes to amend or to delete
certain sentences from the Congressional Records.

He has probably good reasons

to take information about the English languagP. for·granted, but in order to
assess the consequences of the sentences of his concern, the politician may have
to consult his images about the political system •·lithin Hhich he sees himself
interacting with his colleagues, with the administration,

;o~ith

pressure groups

-37and with the public,

Considering each of these potential recipients' expertise

with the subject matter, their beliefs and valuc,s, he may have to estimate what
message chara.cteristics these sentences may ha-ve for them.

Considering furthe't'

their objectives and possibilities to express their consent or dissent to the
proposal, he may have to ascertain how their responses might detain or facilitate
his own political future, etc.

In short, the representative is considering a

network of possible interdependencies among purposive political subsystems in his
environment, each of which must be characterized by a hierarchy of types of
knowledge.

Even if the analyst wishes to make inferences only about the intentions

of the child 1 s statement or n£ the politician's amendment or deletion, he wil.l
have to have constructs that are at least as complex as the information the

manipulating agent uses in making decisions among possible instrumental verbalizations.
One of the erucial formal prerequisites of conununication models of messages
involving purposive systems is therefore an adequate representation of information
about information about information, g".t£· Such a hierarchieal structure already
appears 'i·lhen statements are contrasted 'i·d.th information about >;·;rhat the statements

claim to represent,

The instrumental use of lies 'or inferences from apparent

inconsistencies, as is typieal of much of political analysis of documents,
presupposes the e.bility to handle such representational hierarchies of information.
Such hierarchies can become extremely complicated i.n typically human interaction
situations.
imbedded

In the information about the opponent that the agent employs may be

the opponent 1 s information about the agent, as well as the information

he possesses about the agent's information about him, etc.

Representational

theory handles such hierarchical structures only very clumsily.
formulation of "information about" has to my

kno1~ledge

A J:"..<'IO.~J::\l.e

not been developed.

I

believe that such a formulation is one of the prerequisites for constructing
adequate conmmnication models of messages 1vhen conmmnicators can be attributed
~1ith

some intelligence.
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Let me leave the recursive formulation of representational information as
an open problem and turn to the nature of the consequences Hith \Vhich communica··

tion models ,;ill have to deal, particularly, to the form of the inferential
argument for \11hich the analyst seeks structural information.
Suppose the state descriprion "it's really hot today" is made at a party.

Its factual content is quite trivial for it may be verified in reference to the
present experiences of each participant.

Neither is a unique motivation of the

speaker immediately ascertainable from the statement alone nor is it likely that
a unique behavior Hill follm·l.

But the statement m!ly impose a particular

constraint on the cons0quent interactions, leaving open a large class of
appropriate illocutiona1·y

rc~sponses.

Hhile demanding some recognition of its

receipt, the statement may stimulate an expression of consensus or disagreement
among participants and may establish a situation in ·which the host recognizes

his chance to demonstrate his hospitality.

The likely consequence of the

statement is not so much a particular response but rather the exclusion of a
certain class of initially possible responses, leaving a wide variety of choices

to the participants.

Thus content, according to this model of messages, might

be said to become manifest in the constraints
imposed on a situation
.....
.. ······~-

£_C!,!:!.~~q~~_eg~-~

~~

g

of linguistic and non-linguistic exchrtnges.

The content of instructions may be similarly considered.

Whether they appear

as rules of thumb, as sales guidelines or as national policies, their linguistic
form can hardly be said to be descriptive of events or ideas.

\111en Instituted,

they have a profound effect on the organization and coordination of behavior by
excluding certain trajectories and leavine others open for individual-and
situation-specific interpretations.

The content of explanatory frameHorks may

likewise be assessed in terms of the structure they impose on the possible
observations; the content of collective symbols may be seen to become manifest
in their possibility to channel the diverse activities of individuals into a
certain direction; and the content of political values can be regarded as becoming
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evident in the kind of decisions they lcgi timize.

S imilarl.y, lm·1s do not contain

rules for good conduct but their content is negatively manifest by specifying the
punishments that can 'be expe.cted '\\'hen criminal acts are exposed.

political values, and lm·7S no doubt make up much of
technologically advanced society.

'l;\7

Symbols,

hat is exchanged in a

Such commurd cations do not have referents, but

rnny impose constraints on the subsequent behavior.
In their discussion of the instrumente.l use of language,

~lahl

(1959) and

Pool (1959) give the impression that the antecedent "intent" of purposive
verbalizations differ from their descriptive contents only by being latent and

non-conventionalized,

I think, hoHever, that a consideration of messages as being

informatjve about the direction of control of interactions by virtue of the
constraints they impose on the possible consequences, differs from discourse models

of messages in a more fundamental r..·1ay.

The inferences that discourse models provide are usually r_osit;Lv_e in the
sense that a given linguistic item refers, connotes or denotes a particular
object or class of objects, and sentences describe particular states or structures

in

t~eir

tenns.

In contrast to this, communication models ah·1ays regard content

inferences negatively:

the observer of a dynamic system involving symbolic behavior

will have to consider all conceivable alternative trajectories, and try to
ascertain why a large number of them could not occur after certain linguistic
expressions Here introduced so that the particular trajectory that was observed
is one of those that was not excluded.

The instrumental communicator within

such a system of interactions will have to choose assertions that restrict the
consequent acts in such a v1ay that the remaining free variation confroms to his

objectives.

Similarly, the message analyst attempts to make inferences from

the recorded interchanges as to the nature of the constraints that either exist
and thus govern the system of interactions, or are subsequently imposed on a
situation, leaving undefined hoi·Jever, exactly which behavior will in fact

occur and exactly 1·1hich internal states may have initiated the consequent constraint.
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of inferences is the theory of evolution under natural selection.
suggests which Ol'ganLsms cannot be viable in a particula:t·

unable to say Hhieh ones Hill actually emerge.

The theory

~nvironment

but is

He eoes on to say that:

The negative form of these explanations is precisely comparable
to the form of logical proof by reductio a<! absurdum.
In this
species of proof, a sufficient set of mutually exclusive alternative
propositions is enumerated, e.g. 11 P" and 11 not P, 11 and the process
of proof precedes by demonstrating that all but one of this set are
untenable or "absurd." It folloHs that the surviving member of the
set must be tenable Hithin the terms of the logical system. This is
a .form of proof ~;hich the non-mathematician sometimes finds unconvincing and, no doubt, the theory of natural selection sometimes
seems unconvincing to non-mathematical persons for similar reasons ~;hatever thooc reasons may be (Bateson, 1967).
In the biological sphere, evolution by natural selection is an uni-

directional procoss:

there is no feedback to parent generations.

Instrumental

conununications, and consequently, the control processes they establish within
a system of inter·aetion, are critieally linked to conceiv_able. feedback loops

of messagc->;s are not concerned.

The child 1-1hich doesn't mind lying may consider giving a description of the
events that not only structure its parent's perception but subsequently prevents
the parent from imposing undesired restrictions upon the child.

Often though

the child is not sophisticated enough and considers only one such inferential
loop Hhile the parent may consider further feedback loops to estimate the
degree to 1·1hich the Gtatcmcnt may be trusted.

Similarly is the congressman lvho

subsumes his speech under political objectives bound to make his inferences
along the circular floH of consequent events..

At each stage he may ·Hant to

consider the extent to Hhich his speech imposes a constraint on the situation,
what other constraints exist, and hoH the series of consequent constraints
ultimately control his 01m variety of possible acts.
Hhile state descriptions may be said to impose constraints on subsequent
behavior as a secondary phenomenon, a large class of linguistic forms pertain
primarily or exclusively to such constraints.

This is particularly true for
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demands, claims, treaties, etc.

Demands may be "verified" by compliance and

the content of demands thus becomes manifest i.n the system of interactions
among at least tHo communicatcn·s,

In particular situations, the assertion of

demands implicitly or explicitly informs the recipient about rewards and

punishment consequent to his choice of a particular behavior, and may force
compliance hy making these conceivable consequences credible.

The communication

of demands cannot therefore reasonably be made unless i t structures at least
two interaction loops:

consequent actE:

> p u n i s h i n g effect

In order to understand aad descri_be the structure of communication situations
in "\oJhich linguistic exchanges

dE:~

lennlne lhe paramc ters of the. interact ion, the

task of the analyct becom2f; one of inferring from the chronology of exchanges

the circular form of mutually i!J!posed and interLocking constraints,

The form

of content inference that communication models of messages are intcndecl to
facilitate may therefore be said to be:

1.

Negative, i.e. it entails the ascertaining of the constraints imposed on
a variety of possible consequences rather than the isolation of a
particular trajectory,

2.

Circular, i.e. it is based on inferring the contents of linguistic
exchanges along the possible chains of events each ultimately closing
at their respective origins rather than on infen·ing in one direction
only, and involves

3.

Analytical

constntct~

oJ: control 1·1ith some order of prediction for

rendering the recorded text informative about the interaction parameters
of the source.

-42These circular inferences, which theoretically could go on

.C!_~ I.nfinitm~,

may

find thei.r definite limit<>tion in the hierarchy of information that each party
possesses about the information each other party posSesses etc.

Once this

information is exhausted in thi.s cireular extrapolation from past interactions,
very little can be said beyond it.

But practical limitations are more likely to

set the limit on the understanding of the system of interactions:

With each

inferential loop the problems spiral to increasingly unmanagable propor·tions.

Some

Nanif~stati~ms

of

Cot_].~t_raint~

This peculi::1.r nature of the content inferences that communication models

provide profoundly affect their possible validation.

l·lhile there is no operdtional

test for the procedural adequacy of discourse models (Chomsky, 1957), their
performance can be at least checked against the ability of knowledgeable sp"akcrs
of a language to understand what a discourse is about.
1

almost belongs to the very definition of l£bnguage.

11

Intersubjectivc agrccme.nt

The relations among

conmn_micators th[lt develop in the course of verbal cxchances are, on the other
hand, rarely so fnstituti.onali.zed and their assessment

t"f~qnires

considerable

insights as far as the analyst is concerned.

I mentioned that the recorded text can be regarded a chronology of exclwnges
between communicators -Hhich are patterned according to time, place of origin and
destination and may contain references across these exchanges as '\·lell.

As

Ross Ashby and Charles HcClelland suggest, the analyst, 1·1ho attempts to understand
the source• s system of interaction, ·will have to infer from this rec:ord the

existing and consequent constraints accounting for and imposed upon the nature
of the source (Auhby, 1958; NcClelland, 1964).

Difficulties arise out of the

fact that this chronology represents only a single ·trajectory of interactional
behavior and provides no obvious evidence of the trajectories that 1·1ere excluded
in the course of the recoJ:ded process.

Even 1·1hen the chronology covers a long

period of time, the number of possible trajectories is often so large that they

cannot be

11

acted out" systematica]Jy.

\·n1en the interaction situation is

. relatively stable, i.e., constraints are invariant, inferences about their
existencC'.. still remain difficult.

For example, if all citizens HDu1cl confine

their behavior w:lthin li.m:i.ts that happen to be prescribed by law, i t "ould neither
be possible to ascertain the limits prescribed by

la~-1

from the behavio1· observed

nor could it bc; ascertained Hhether the laH is in fact effective.

Simila·cly,

a naive observer would have a hard time inferring the rules that are effective
from the chess players 1 moves.

In both cases 1 inguis tic and non-linguistic

behavior may have to be consulted.
I see essentially three Hays of obtaining

symbol:i.cally ind·uced constr.1ints,

~viclen~~

fo:r the exj_stence of

The h>.ast reliable inferences may be made.

from explicit cowp liances to demands, from pledges or from conunitments, '1;·7hatE-.ver

form they may take.

Layman Allen, for example, showed hou many possibilities are

h>ft open to the signatories of a segment of the nuclear test han treaty (Allen,

1963).

And the analysis of political values in decision mal<ing 1·1hich is proposed

by Philip Jacob (Jacob, _g_to._a_!. 1962) is a similar
on alternatives that

arc~

attet>~)t

to a.scertai.n const::aints

accepted \·d. thin a source for whatever reasons.

But:

treaties may be 1nadc \·lith the implicit understanding that they can be broken

and political values may be asserted 1-dthout making decisions accordingly.

'l'hus,

i f taken alone, the validity of this form of evidence is highly questionable.

Evidence for the existence of constraints may, secondly, be found in th<e
conmmnicator 1 s account of his insights about the e.xc luded alternatives,

diaries by political decision makers often provide such information.

Private

For

example, when choices among possible actions are justified in the light of the
undesirable consequences that result from some of them, the severity of situational
constraints reveal themselves quite clearly.

The expressed insights of our

thirsty guest at the party may similarly exhibit the nature of the existing
constraints.

He may reason like this:

1

1 will loose my stat us as a guest if

caught grabbing a Hiskey bottle, I will be judged unrefined when asserting that

I am thirsty; I cannot afford insulting the host by asking Hhy he didn't serve
drinks, etc.

1

The assertion of a statement. \·7hich survives this negative form

of reasoning Hill not reveal very much about the structure of the situ.at.:ton.
Hhile this form of evidence may be particularly open to certAin interview
situations ·Hhen couununicators vie,., their verbalizations instrumentally,

the

analyst rarely cc:n rely on it .
. · The third form of evidence may be found in the consequences of violating a
constraint hoHevet· it \·las introduced,

This again exhibits the control aspect

,.Jj_th ·which communication models are essentially concerned,

It suggests that

the seriousness of promises could be inferred from the consequences of not
sticl<.ing to them;

that the pm·Jel'.' of demands hecmncs evident in Hhilt follo\·78 from

failures to comply; and that the reality of commitments appears in the condemnation
of deviations.

In the extreme, the assessment of the content of la·'i'l HOuld require

to study the crimes that are identified and punished according to the text.
This ,.,ould rcveaJ ,.,hich paragraphs are merely paper \·lithin a legal system anri
\•lhich effectively limit the possible behavjors of citi%ens.

Hhen less institutional··

ized fcrcms of interaction arE analyzed, the identification of incidents of
violation and condemw=ttion is not ah·ntys an easy matter.

Even the identification

of provoc~tive and conciliatory moves involves a considerable amount of infol~mation

about. the structure of control processes Hithin the source Hithout 1-1hich
conmlUnication models do not yield adequate content inferences.
I hope it is quite clear from my discussion that the analytical constructs
of control processes involving higher orders of prediction from verbal interactions
are very little understood and demand considerable investigative attention before
rigorous message analytic procedures can be designed,

There is no single form

of evidence for the existence of controls affected by the linguistic and nonlinguistic exehanges.

The analyst has to utilize all of them simultaneously and

particularly consider apparent inconsistencies, violations and justifications in

order to develop suitable constructs of control 1-1hich in turn Hill help him to
assess the

variety·~

limiting consequences of exchanges.

Current attempts to

-45obLain evidence about contrc,l relations that emerge be tHe en nations, social

organizations or individuals axe e"tther extremely reduced (to non-verbal
int:er<tetJon) or re.l!lain
HOd(

OD_

the level of

po~~-~

l_l.9c explanationn.

Perhaps the

of the Palo Alto group uhich recently presented a n:lce onalysis of the

interactions depicted in Albee's !-nl<)'_,; AfxaicJ. _c>.f Y.irgLn_i" J·loolf (Hatdm1ick, e~·"!·,
1967) could provide a starting point.

Although I cannot point to any notev10rthy fonnalizati.on of conm1unication
models of messages, they all involve extracting from a chronology of linguistic
and non·-lineuj_stic exchanger; the_, follmving:
(a:.

information about the ident':i.ty of the .!:_€!.§ic_ s:.~~!~_!ll.!_0c~_t<?J:~~ of the source and
their boundaries.

(b)

Informati.on about the .S..!c.l'ltes _of each conl]Jone_g_S of the source including the
communicators

1

possible perceptions of the situation, their conununication and

behavioral strategies, evaluative frameHorks and objectives.
(c)

tnformation about the tra_!_""I_~E~L~~i--~.!J. .facilit~J-e~, time delay~;> ch,;mnels and
s t c1 b 1 c rc la lions

(d)

be t'qcen

t-hc~

c ontmurde:a tors.

Information about the existing constraints that have evolved in the course of
previous interactions, i.e., the system's has:i.c operating rules and parameters,
the definition of the situation and of the conmmnicators' roles, shared or

not.
(e)

Information about the

mechani~rns

,of control and the regulating p01·1er of

the exchanged verbalization t·lhich structure those mechanisms,
(f)

lnfonnation about the hierarchical structure and quantity of knoHledg_E!
available to the communicators about the possible dynamic interdependencies

between the souyce 1 s components.
Hith this information, the analyst may be able to develop a _specific model of
the Conmmrd.cat ion situation

j

nvolving analytical cons true ts of control.

These

may render the recorded 1 i_nguin tic exchanges ·Hi thin a source infonna tive about the
structure of interactjon and its dynamic consequences.

CONCLUDING RENARKS
Let me try to summariz:e some. of my points.

I think it is 'important to

conceptually abandon the idea of arw.ly;.-;ing ,!_he content of

.~ m2ssa.ge.

Content

cannot be analyze.d but it may be inferred by an analyst in reference to some

source against th2 behavior of Hhich eontent inferenees may be validated,
·. · By defining .messag.§', ."Jlaly_c;is as ."12.)': scientific:: ,11!§.thod for making ."J'eci.f:Lco
content:: .tnference" fro_111 reco1:ded text I \olish to emphasize that it is the
analys_.t_ to 'dhom a text may become informative nbout unobserved states) events
or phenomena of the sol...o:ce; furthermore, analytical construct13 for making
the inferences ~t~~~-!J~ bE~ .§.~Ji/-)~.i~ and open to c1e.tailec1 examination inUependen't

of the particular situation in Hhich they are applied.

Hhere explicit techniques

are merely analytical aids and the crucial process of making inferences i.s left

to the insights ancl cognition of a human analyst, I sug3est that the term "message
analysis" be avoided.
The choice of a particttlAr analytical construct for the analysis of messages
evidently implies certain assumptions regarding the nature of the source.

This

raises the important question of the adequacy of such constructs in particular
situations,

But regardless of whether such questions are answered affirmatively

or not three prototypes of analytical constructs or basic models of messages seem
to be distinguishable.

I referred to them as association !~odels, discou~--"-" models

and _c.'.'J1'1_nunic1l_tion !''().clels respectively. Theit· crucial difference appears (a) in
the assumptions made about the structure of the source, (b) in the kind of information relevant for designing the required analytical procedures, (c) in the structure that is initially imposed upon the input data when recording them, (d) in the
message characteristics that the data acquire in the course of the analytical process, i.e., the inferred c\mtent, and (e) in the kind of evidence required for
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A Comparison of Hodels of Hessages
Figure 4
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verifying the content inferen.ces made.

tet me represent these differences

tabularly in Figure. 4 Hithout rcvicHing them in detail.
Hith this differentiation I do not wish to imply that such modele: provide
mutually exclusive alternatives for an analysis.

Conununication models often

presuppose and incorporate the information provided by both discourse modele
and association wodels.

If it is compatible Hith an analynt 1 s inferential ajm

then the statistical operations of association models may Hell be applied sub·
sequent to the algebraic operations of a discourse logic.

However, the analytic-

al functions of these models, their logical possibilities and limitations should
be understood.
If one prefc'l'S semiotic tenninolo8y such as that of Charles Pierce (Burks,

1949) then one would probably have to say that association models consider a text
as a set of "ind:Lces, 11 discourse models regard a text as a pattern of

11

~mbol~

11

while the vieH of coinmunication moclcls t·Jould have to remain unlabeled althour;h

subsmnable under the

r.:!:'.~JQ!!~.t~£

branch of the theory of signs.

But this apparent:

congruency Hith t;emiotic terminology is only a superficial one and may become
misleading when

spc-~cific

investigative techniques .are discussed.

If one shares

the semioticists 1 search for the relations accorUing to which symbols are inter.-preted then one I·Tould have to say that association models are concerned 1·lith
correlational dependencies, causal or not; discourse models deal with systeme of
linguistic references, denot:a tions or connotations; and communication models
sider

~_ntro.ls

or interactional

co:Q_seg~Ienc~:...~.

con·~

But these are only convenient labels.

I do think that the concern tvith models of messages is more productive for

the study of sod.al communication than the semiotic approach has been.

This is

because the former aims at representing pnt'tial theories of.§! source, i.e., j_ts
symbolic processes, 1·1ith which the latter has not been able to deal.

Let me give

just one example of the confusion that results from such global labels as "symbol"
and its

11

interpretat:i.on."

At a recent confc.rence, Jurgen Ruesch and Samuel

-49Eisenstadt got into an interesting argument about Hhether

order to be effec.:tive within
pretations.

<1.

B.

system of symbols, in

society, require homogeneous or heterogeneous inter-

Ruesch exemplified his po:int by referring to Lraff:ic signs the hete:r_·u-

geneous interpreta t i.on of wld ch \•Jould result in disastrous
Eisenstadt, on th2. other hand) refer1:ed to

11

traffic ace ident s.

The Rock of Israel 11 \V.hich is knoun to

connote quite a number of things to different citizens of Israel 'I·Jithout making
the .. symbol less poHerful in regard to the national identity it promotes (Thayer,

1967: L,73-L,76).

It seems that it is just because the intent to survive the

traffic is shared by a population of drivers vlith approximately equal poHer to
influence the situation that the interpretation of traffic signals can be recluced

to discourse models.

Hhen a political sycuhol

j

s chosen to organize. and channel a

large variety of different activities, each guided by potentially different c•bjcct··
ives, such reduction may not be appropriate.

In each case the term

11

int:erpretation 11

has to denote quite different processes although all 1nay involve inferences as to
;~hat

the symbol relates to.
Only in part have I mentioned the r_ossi£>_g:ic~.Y. of .".'c'-I_"J'..''.!ce_ti_;dng these models,

Let me make only n

fe~·J

comments on this problem,

Regarding association models, I

see no serious obstacles. Computer programs for statistical procedures are easily
available

althou~t

the pioneering

;~ork

not all of them accept verbal data as inputs,
done by Philip Stone et

l'.1·

In this respect

(1963; 1966) should be mentioned.

Regarding discourse models the situation does not look as favourable.

Pro-

grams providing semantic characterizAtions of natural language sentences currently
require·an undue amount of time and their results are not ahvays useful.

In order

to come to more practical algorithms it is probably advisable to accept goals that
are less ambitious than those considered by linguists,

But even if the obstacles

of such semantic characterizations ,.,ere removed, I suggest that it is impossible
to expect general algorithms for the analysis of all conceivable discourses,

The
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information that would have to go into such a discourse logic would have to
represent all a speaker knoHs about the world,

But I do believe that it is possible

to develop discourse logics for limited dontaitlS or specialized subject matters,
the structure of \·Jhich is knm'ln or not too involved,

Kinship relations is but a

primitive example of certain list structures into t<7hich other discourses may be

mapped as well,
tent inferences.

Available simulation languages may set limitations for such conI see the formalization of specialized discourse logics and com-

patible kernelization procedures as the most important step tm·1ards inferring a
text's referential content.
I think, the problems of computerizing communication models of messages a-re
extremely difficult to solve,

Clearly, their formalization presupposes both ade-·

quate association models and adequate discourse models,

But I 1-1onder i f the cur-

rently available soft1-1are is capable of representing systems of linguistic and
non-1 inguist ic exchange:;; among intelligent comHlunica tot·s,

Perhaps this kind of

message analysis is bound to be made by human analysts ,., ho eRn specify the con1

straints of a sittiation more easily using computers merely as aids for concepttJali-

zation,

Even the most reduced attempt to formalize cormnunication models of

messages HOttld be a great step forward.

Hhether this is possible at all I am unable

to judge,
Let me close by suggesting that much of our concern with the content of
messages is to discover the non-obvious, to infer 1vhat is hi.clden, to gain inform-

ation about what cannot be seen, and to make messages out of signals that remain
signals for others.

It always requires an analy_tical sophistication that is great-

er than that possessed by the source.

If analysts reduce the power of their analyt--

ical facilities for the sake of efficiency, or in compliance with narrm·7 scientific
standards, then their inferences may become quite misleading.

Almost always is it

possible for an intelligent source to outwit an analyst Hith a reduced repertoire
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of models of messages by relying on a way of concealing or conveying signific,ont
information that is more pOI·Jerful than his models cern handle,

It is for this

reason that I call for a thorough examination of the adequacy of available analytical constructs of messages. in the light of knm·!l1or conceivable sources of

information.

-52FOOTNOTES

1.

It should be noted that I usc "source" to denote any kind of system that is
identifiable by i.ts variables in the analyst's envi~onment and of which some
information is available. A source in this sense includes a situation in
which

b;.Jo

human communicators or social organizations interact through tile

exchange of signals or massages.
11

Such situations are often described in

11

terms of "source" or sender) ''transmitter" and "receiver.'' The term "source"
as used in this paper is not limited to the dcnotat:ion of single conmmnication
agents that are identified because of thei:c sending signals to some other
·.··agents; it is more general.
2.

Someti_mes

11

meaning 11 is understood to refer to the rules account:i.ng for the

use of sign-vehicles or signals in particular contexts. An object that
po~·sess_es meaning in this sense may be said to be one for \·lhich a receivL~r
has some sucl1 rules, The arrow in the diagram then denotes that particular
meaning whicl.• relates a received signal (the raH data) to some contents
(the inaccessible states of tl1e source) an~ througl1 whj_ch messages are re~l-·
ized. Although tl1c genc1alizcd message an2lytic process can be quite adeqttatc··
1y depicted by the process:

\vhen the
ations,

recci.vE~cl
11

mE.~aning

11

signals are members of a language--like system of represent··
has been taken to refer only to a part of this inferential

process.
3,

This definition deviates in several respects from definitions of content analysis of ,.,hich the one attr:ibutcd to Berelson is by far the most popular: "Content
analysis is a research technique for the objective> systematic, and quantitative
description of the manifest content of communications" (Berelson and Lazarsfeld,
191•8: 5). By leaving the crucial term "content" undefined, the definition fails
to delineate the empirical domain of the technique. References to "objectivity,"
"system," and "quantification" merely stipulate that the technique conform to
scientific standards.
Among the most recent definitions is the one proposed by Ole Holsti ,;hich
reads: 11 Conte<Ot analysis is any technique for systematically and objectively
identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1966:7). Here
the process of making specific inferences ,;hi.ch probably offers the most crucial distinction between treating data as observations, and treating data as
messages about unobserved phenomena, is not recognised. Content analysis is
then often reduced to a technique for characterizing the occurrences of the
constituent elements of a text. The significance of content inferences has
been emphasi.~ed by Alexander George (1959), Charles Osgood (1959:36) and
George Gerbner (1958:86).

4.

A good example is the use of factor analytic techniques. The process typically
involves the follm.1ing: First, a text is scored on many dimensions, each of
which is intuitively meaningful and named in accordance with the analyst's
conceptions, Second, an explicit statistical procedure is applied which
identi.fies correlational clusters or factors, Third, the analyst attemptsto
make sense out of these clusters of dimensions and tries to find suitnble con-
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cepts and accompanying nautes based upon inspection of the semantic inter-

pretations of these dimensions that constitute the cluster.

The explicit

procedure merely climi.nates correlntlonal redundancies, The r.·my this is
nccompl.ished has very little to do with scmanl:ic processes or t!1ose of
cogrtitiott, The difficuJ.t job of a seinatltic irtterpretation of the results
is tl1en entirely left to the analyst's intuition,
5,

6.

Hhat L call observational adequacy should not be confused Hith reliability
as meast•red by the amounl of agreement achieved during a recording process,
Reliability is a prerequisite of analytical success but it docs not in any
r,vay assess r.·Jhether significant information· is maintained during a recordin'g
~ .. process,
Informativeness 1vithin association models can be given a more precise notion·
by means of· Shannon's information theory.
If C is the set of possible con-.
tents of interest to the analyst, and Hm(C)
is the partial conditional entropy ih C,. the particular measu·rc m being kno,,Jn, lhe information I
that m conveys about C is

I
7,

= U(C)

- IIIll'(C)

In terms of information theory (see footnote 6) this is due to the fact that
'Hhichever twc measures m1 and m2 are given

H (C) - ll,n (C)
1

H (C) - lim m (C)

1 2

8.

This has been the main argument of the transformationel school of linguistics,
particularly of Noam Chomsky (1957), for a recursive description of grammar.

9.

It should be remarked thnt 1·7henever traditjonal content analysis aims at
describing the manifest content in the autho:r: 1 s language, such a sit:uat ion in
fact' exists, Hhen such content analyses follo1oJ purely descriptive aims -even
logical implications arc supposedly excluded,

10.

This point is reflected in L~sz~Antal's Hork. He argues that the sentence:
"The sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees," is meaningful to 1·1hoever
is able to give a semantic description of the sentence just on the basis of
the knoHledge about the use of its constituent \'lords and their relative syntactical pos·it:ions. But for an understandi.ng of Hhat: the sentence is about,
i.e .. ; for a comprehension of its content, other than ~inguistic knmvledge -is
requirecl,c' Evidently, an English speaking child may be able to describe the
sentence semantically Hithout understanding it, The ability to semant.ically
describe a, sentence is a prerequisi.te for i.ts understanding, "The purpose of:•
the sentence,. and indeed that of language as a '\·Jhole, is to convey content,
and both form and meaning (syntax and semantics) are the means to achieve thiE;
end"
(Antal, 19b4: 24),

11,

In a discuss,ion of "grammatical meaning" Roman Jacobson reports that "Dell
Hymes·act,tally found an application for this sentence in a senseful poent
· Hritten in 1957 and entitled 'colorless Green Ideas Sleep Furiously'"
(Jacobson, 1959: ll1lf),

12,

·n

should be noted that several studies have recorded the direction of exchanges.
In his cano~1ical recording format, Ole Holsti recognizes at least the producer
of the statements and the perceiver of the situation to Hhich they refer.(North
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et .'1}. •, 1963: 137), Another way of recording interactions is suggested by
Elihu Katz _(!!:_ .':'.l· \·lho proposes to analyze the nature of persuasive appeals
that clients of a fonnal organization use· i.u support of requests for services. The six-faceted canonica.l fon11 includes the clients 1 perceptions of
his role in relnti.on to that of the formal organization. (Katz, .<et aJ, 1967).
Such ways of recording do not necessarily produce cltronoloBies of interaction
of the kind comn1unication models reqdire, particularly when the verbalizations
of only one party arc considered and ·when the order of the exchanges is ne··
glected so as to make the text amenable to statistical description.

13.

In a standard game of ct1ess verbalizations exchanged between experienced
.. players are irrelevant to the game, Rules are not negotiable and in forma. tion about the state of the play is always perfect, Communication models
of messages would hardly be appropriate,
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